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Abstract: While much cybercrime is committed by lone individuals, a significant 
amount is accomplished by offenders acting collectively. These groups tend to vary 
significantly in terms of their structure, goals, criminal activities, and organisational 
life courses. The nature of these collectivities, and whether organised cybercrime 
constitutes a national security threat, are the subjects of this chapter. The answer will 
depend on one’s definitions of ‘national security’ and ‘organised cybercrime’. Each of 
these concepts is problematic; the meaning of national security has been stretched 
significantly in recent years, while conceptions of organised crime (terrestrial or in 
cyberspace) have been overly narrow. The chapter concludes that some forms of 
organised cybercrime can indeed threaten national security, both in a more 
conventional sense and in ways previously overlooked. 
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Introduction 
While much cybercrime is committed by individuals acting alone, a significant amount is 
accomplished by offenders acting in concert. These groups have tended to vary significantly 
in terms of their structures, their goals, the criminal activities in which they engage, and their 
organisational life courses. The nature of these collectivities, and the question of whether 
organised cybercrime constitutes a national security threat, are the subjects of this chapter. 
The answer will depend on one’s definitions of ‘national security’ and ‘organised 
cybercrime.’ Each of these concepts is problematic; the meaning of national security has been 
stretched significantly in recent years, while conceptions of organised crime (terrestrial or in 
cyberspace) have been overly narrow. The chapter concludes that some forms of organised 
cybercrime can indeed threaten national security, both in a more conventional sense and in 
ways previously overlooked. 
National Security 
National Security is a term used loosely and for many purposes, not all of them legitimate. 
Traditionally, national security meant the capacity to deter or to resist the invasion of one’s 
territorial borders by foreign military, naval or air forces. Nowadays, the concept has 
expanded to embrace a range of factors that might support this capacity, including threats to 
public health, to education, to welfare, to social cohesion, and to the national economy. In 
recent years, senior US military officials have spoken of the national debt and global 
warming as significant national security threats. 
One should be cautious about uncritically accepting pronouncements relating to security 
risks. Historically, national security has been invoked as a justification for domestic political 
repression, to chill democratic political debate, or to distract public and media attention from 
shortcomings in governance. The Nixon Administration sought to terminate the investigation 
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of the Watergate break-in and cover-up on national security grounds. Appeals to national 
security to justify military intervention are sometimes based on fabricated or exaggerated 
evidence of threat. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was rationalised by the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein (Bamford 2004). This alleged threat proved 
to have been greatly over-stated. More recently, national security pretexts in the United States 
have served to obscure the contours of (and thereby inhibit debate on) the massive electronic 
surveillance program undertaken by the National Security Agency (New York Times 2013). 
Organised Crime  
Organised crime is a term that means many things to many people. Klaus von Lampe’s 
website (http://www.organized-crime.de/organizedcrimedefinitions.htm) contains 150 
definitions.  Most if not all of these tend to be mired in the 20th century, too narrow in scope, 
and too constrained by ideology. Most fail to capture the very significant changes in 
organisational form that have occurred since the beginning of the digital age. 
Traditional definitions of organised crime tended to be based on the profit motive. However, 
even the most insightful observers of ‘terrestrial’ organised crime note the intrinsic attraction 
of excitement, comradeship and other non-material values to participants. Similarly, a great 
deal of organised criminal activity on the internet is driven primarily by non-monetary 
considerations. These include the quest for intellectual challenge, individual or group 
notoriety, lust (in the case of organised paedophile activity), ideology, rebellion, and 
curiosity. Today, there are many criminal organisations active in cyberspace which do not 
exist to enrich their members; nor do they practice violence or engage in bribery.  Moreover, 
the traditional view of criminal organisations consisting of full or part time professional 
criminals was also somewhat simplistic.  In cyberspace, no less than in terrestrial space, some 
criminal organisations have explicit or implicit membership, but may also include a variety of 
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hangers-on, camp followers, consultants and accomplices, some of whom will be well aware 
of their complicity in criminal enterprise, while others may not.  
Conventional organised crime was characterised as monolithic and hierarchical in nature. The 
classic ‘mafia model’ that served as the basis of Cressey’s (1972) analysis four decades ago 
conjured up visions of ethnically-based, pyramidal organisations ruled by ‘godfathers’ or  
‘Mr Bigs.’ By the 1990s, observers of criminal organisations reported that rather than the 
work of formal, enduring structures, a significant amount of criminal activity was undertaken 
by loose coalitions of smaller groups converging temporarily to exchange goods and services 
(Halstead 1998). The idea of vertically integrated enterprises thus gave way to the metaphor 
of networks (Williams 2001), which provided a foundation for contemporary thinking about 
the interrelationships within organised criminal groups and between individual groups 
(Morselli 2009).  Digital technology also facilitates new organisational forms, such as short 
term opportunistic ‘swarms’ which can serve criminal ends, and which differ significantly 
from the traditional hierarchical paradigm of the mid-20th century (Choo and Grabosky 
2014).  
Today, it requires an exceptionally closed mind to deny that states are also capable of 
criminal acts. Throughout recorded history, crimes by state actors have occurred in times of 
peace, as well as during armed conflict. In recent years, there have been allegations of drug 
manufacture and trafficking, illicit arms transfers, and counterfeiting by agents of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Bradsher 2006; Perl 2007).  States have also 
engaged periodically in kidnapping and assassination, at home and abroad. Today, the 
business of the International Criminal Court is booming, notwithstanding the refusal of some 
states to submit to its jurisdiction. 
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Just as the distinctions between public and private sectors have blurred in recent years with 
regard to legitimate activities such as public-private partnerships, contracting out, and other 
mechanisms for the co-production of governance (Grabosky 1995),  there is a long tradition 
of public/private collaboration in criminal activity to advance state interests. Administrators 
of the French Concession in Shanghai during the 1920s and 1930s relied upon the Green 
Gang to suppress industrial unrest and regulate drug markets (Martin 1996; Wakeman 1995, 
123-130). The US Central Intelligence Agency engaged burglars and criminals around the 
world to conduct break-ins and kidnappings, and enlisted mafia members in an unsuccessful 
attempt to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro (Weiner 2007: 186; 199). Toward the end 
of the Apartheid era, South African state security engaged criminal groups to assist with 
‘sanctions busting’ and with resisting ANC insurgents (Standing 2003). 
Organised cybercrime, whether it is the work of ‘conventional’ criminal offenders, nation 
states, or some public/private hybrid, entails a diverse set of organisational forms and 
motives. The following paragraphs describe a number of organisations whose activities have 
been reported in recent years. The cases in question are not the product of a representative 
sample; rather, they have been selected to illustrate the diversity of organised cybercriminal 
exploits by state and non-state actors alike. 
W0nderland was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children, until its 
interdiction by a multi-national police investigation named Operation Cathedral on 2 
September 1998. Simultaneous raids in 14 countries revealed a group of 180 individuals from 
49 countries around the world who collectively possessed over 750,000 illicit images of 
children and over 1,800 digitised videos depicting child abuse. The group had been 
established in the mid-1990s to facilitate file sharing of the images and videos (Russell 2008; 
Graham 2000). It was a very sophisticated collective that vetted prospective members, 
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encrypted the information shared amongst them, and periodically rotated the physical 
location of the servers that supported the group’s activities. 
Anonymous is a loose group of anarchists based largely on a shared ethos of mischief and 
resentment of authority, who engage in what Denning (2001) referred to as ‘hactivism.’  The 
participants’ prevailing ethos of iconoclasm, if not nihilism, began to focus on prominent 
symbols. The chosen methods were website defacements and distributed denial of service 
attacks, complemented by online verbal abuse (Olson 2012). Not surprisingly, the website of 
the US Central Intelligence Agency represented an attractive target.  Imbued with the hacker 
ethos that information should be free, the group also targeted the Church of Scientology 
because of its secrecy, the Motion Picture Association of America for its proprietary 
commercialism, and became a supporter of Wikileaks. When the US Government prevailed 
upon various electronic payment service providers to discontinue processing of contributions 
to Wikileaks after its publication in 2010 of secret US State Department messages, 
Anonymous orchestrated denial of service attacks against the complying sites (Coleman 
2011). 
‘Drink or Die’ was an international group of copyright pirates who illegally reproduced and 
distributed software, games and movies over the Internet. They were motivated less by profit 
than by their desire for recognition as the first group to distribute a perfect copy of a newly 
pirated product.  Founded in Moscow in 1993, the group expanded internationally within 
three years, with members in more than 12 countries including Britain, Australia, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Its approximately 65 members were technologically 
sophisticated, and included IT professionals skilled in security, programming and internet 
communications, each performing specialised roles (US Department of Justice 2002; Lee 
2002; McIllwain 2005; Urbas 2006). 
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The Ukranian ZeuS Group. Software engineers in Eastern Europe had refined malware 
known as the ZeuS virus.  This malicious code was used by one group of Ukranian hackers to 
gain access to the computers of individuals employed in variety of small businesses, 
municipalities, and non-government organisations in the United States. Target computers 
were compromised when the victim opened an apparently benign email message. With access 
to the victim’s bank account numbers and password details, principals in the Ukraine were 
able to log on to the target organisations’ bank accounts.  Accomplices of the Ukranian 
principals placed notices on Russian language websites inviting students resident in the 
United States to assist in transferring funds out of the country. These so-called ‘mules’ were 
provided with counterfeit passports, and were directed to open accounts in false names in 
various US financial institutions. When principals in the Ukraine transferred funds from 
legitimate account holders to the mules’ accounts, the mules were instructed to move the 
funds to accounts offshore, or in some cases, to smuggle the funds physically out of the 
United States (FBI 2012).  
Dark Market was a forum for the exchange of stolen credit card and banking details, 
malicious software, and related technology. Its website provided the infrastructure for an 
electronic bazaar-- a meeting place for buyers and sellers of the illicit material.  The forum 
was founded in May, 2005 in order to take advantage of the criminal opportunities presented 
by the advent of electronic banking and the increasing use of credit and debit cards. Banking 
and card details were illicitly obtained by various means, including surreptitious recording 
with ‘skimming’ devices, unauthorised access to personal or business information systems, or 
techniques of ‘social engineering’ where victims were persuaded to part with the details at the 
request of an ostensibly legitimate source.  At its peak, Dark Market was the world’s pre-
eminent English language ‘carding’ site, with over 2500 members from a number of countries 
around the world, including the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Russia, Turkey, 
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Germany and France. Shortly thereafter, having been infiltrated by an undercover FBI agent, 
the market ceased operation (Glenny 2011). 
Operation Olympic Games is reportedly a collaboration between the US National Security 
Agency and its Israeli counterpart, Unit 8200, intended to disrupt the Iranian nuclear 
enrichment program. It allegedly involved the clandestine insertion of an extremely complex 
and sophisticated set of software into communications and control systems at the Natanz 
nuclear facility. The software reportedly includes a capacity to monitor communications and 
processing activity, as well as the ability to corrupt control systems at the facility.  The 
operation succeeded in delaying the progress of uranium enrichment through remote 
controlled destruction of a number of centrifuges used in the process.  The secrecy 
surrounding the operation was compromised in part when the malicious software escaped 
because of a programming error.  Neither the United States nor the Israeli governments are 
inclined to discuss the operation (Sanger 2012; Zetter 2014). 
Ghost Net was the name given by a group of Canadian researchers in 2010 to a cyber-
espionage operation apparently operating from commercial internet accounts in China. The 
hackers compromised government computers in over 100 countries on several continents; 
prominent among them was India. They also targeted emails from the server of the Dalai 
Lama (Markoff and Barboza 2010). The Chinese Government denied involvement, and there 
was no conclusive evidence to the contrary.  There was, however, some evidence of 
government complicity. Chinese officials have confronted expatriate dissidents returning to 
China with transcripts of internet chats in which they were involved during their absence.  
Whether the activity in question was the work of patriotic hackers acting unilaterally, or 
skilled individuals with guidance from state authorities who were otherwise acting at arm’s 
length, remains unclear. Canadian investigators claim to have found evidence of links to two 
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individuals in the underground hacking community of the PRC (Information Warfare 
Monitor 2010). 
PLA Unit 61398 
In February 2013, the information security company Mandiant reported that a large scale 
program of industrial espionage had been undertaken since 2006 by Unit 61398 of the 
People’s Liberation Army (Mandiant Intelligence Center 2013; Sanger, Barboza and Perlroth 
2013). Based in Shanghai, this organisation is alleged to have acquired a massive volume of 
data from a wide variety of industries in English-speaking countries.  Information alleged to 
have been taken includes technical specifications, negotiation strategies, pricing documents 
and other proprietary data. One of the alleged targets, a major US beverage manufacturer, 
was planning in 2009 what was to have been the largest foreign purchase of a Chinese 
company to date.  It was reported that an apparently innocuous email to an executive of the 
US company contained a link, which, when it was opened, allowed the attackers access to the 
company network. Sensitive information on pending negotiations was reportedly accessed by 
Chinese intruders on a regular basis; the purchase did not eventuate. It is unclear whether the 
unit is staffed exclusively by military personnel or includes civilian contractors. The US 
Government filed criminal charges against Five PLA officers were charged in absentia by the 
US Department of Justice in 2014 (Schmidt and Sanger 2014). 
  
The Prism Program 
 The Prism program entails systematic harvesting of digital information by the US National 
Security Agency (NSA). Outlined five years earlier by Bamford (2008), further classified 
details of the scheme were disclosed in 2013 by whistleblower Edward Snowden (Gidda 
2013).  Part of a larger  NSA program of data capture, storage and analysis, Prism was 
assisted by some of the world’s more prominent IT companies, including Microsoft, Google, 
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Yahoo!, Facebook, Pal Talk, You Tube, Skype AOL and Apple. The program reportedly 
captured and stored a wide range of data, including email, chatroom exchanges, voice-over 
internet protocol (VOIP), photos, stored data, file transfers, video conferencing, and other 
social network content (Greenwald 2014). The precise nature of the engagement between the 
agency and the IT companies remains unclear. In some instances, industry cooperation was 
required by secret court order; some degree of voluntary cooperation may also have occurred.  
The legality of such data collection under US law has been challenged; it seems likely that 
the activity has breached the law of a number of nations whose citizens’ communications 
were intercepted (Donohue 2013). 
Public-Private partnerships in Cybercrime 
One characteristic of state or state-sponsored cybercrime appears to be its hybrid 
organisational form.  One might envisage a continuum of state-private interaction, from state 
ignorance of private criminal activity at one extreme, to state monopoly of criminal activity at 
the other. In between these polar extremes, one might find state incapacity to control private 
illegality; the state turning a ‘blind eye’ to the activity in question; tacit encouragement of 
non-state crime; active sponsorship by the state; loose cooperation between state authorities 
and private criminal actors; then formal collaboration between state and non-state entities.   
 One notes that Russian ‘patriotic hackers’ were allegedly involved in cyber attacks on 
government servers in Estonia. It has also been suggested that Chinese civilian IT specialists 
working in one or more universities are linked with the People’s Liberation Army. It has been 
reported that the North Korean Army has trained hackers to commit fraud for the purpose 
of raising revenue. The North Korean state was allegedly involved with a hacking ring 
that exploited online gaming sites and generated US$6 million in cash (Greitens 2012). 
The US National Security Agency spends millions of dollars engaging private consultants 
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to assist it in collecting and analysing communications intelligence (Bamford 2008; 
Priest and Arkin 2011, 189-90). Whistleblower Edward Snowden was one of them, having 
been previously employed by a major government contractor, Booz Allen. In most cases of 
state or state-sponsored cybercrime, the degree of explicit state involvement remains obscure; 
this should come as no surprise, as plausible deniability is a valued condition for all 
criminals, state or private, terrestrial or cyber.   
Most types of cybercrime can be committed by individuals or by organisations, although the 
latter can be capable of activities on a grander scale. At the extreme, operations as complex 
and sophisticated as Olympic Games, the cyber espionage activities of the People’s 
Liberation Army, and the Prism project of the US National Security Agency, require very 
many hands. 
State cybercrime activity tends to involve espionage, surveillance, and destruction or 
degradation of an adversary’s systems. It tends to be motivated by the need to identify and to 
neutralise perceived national security threats, or to give one’s nation a strategic advantage. 
Conventional organised cybercrime activity is more diverse, and depending on crime type, 
tends to involve a wider variety of objectives, from financial gain, to sexual gratification, to 
political protest, to notoriety. Both state and private cybercrime may produce adverse 
unintended consequences for the perpetrator; state and state-sponsored cybercrime may 
ironically cause harm to national security. 
Iatrogenic security threats     
Organisations sometimes inflict damage upon themselves, most commonly through strategic 
misjudgement. Commonly, they fail to adapt to a changing environment. In the commercial 
world, businesses may fail to be attuned to market signals. Paoli (2003) describes the lack of 
adaptability on the part of some traditional Mafia groups: Among the factors she identifies are 
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the inward focus on family, village and neighbourhood, the inability or unwillingness to 
broaden the pool of new recruits, and the consequent failure to exploit emerging market 
opportunities such as the growing illicit arms trade. 
Organisations may also suffer from over-extending themselves. Business history is littered with 
the remains of companies whose directors, blinded by hubris or emboldened by previous 
successes, sought to expand too rapidly. The overreach of organised crime may also backfire. 
The assassinations of Sicilian investigating judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 
1992 were more than just Mafia ‘hits.’ The massive explosions themselves constituted a 
political statement, and were obviously intended to discourage further investigative activity. 
Ironically, these killings had the effect of provoking widespread revulsion to organised crime 
and of fostering public support for increased law enforcement powers (Cowell 1992; Paoli 
2003, p. 204). 
The decisions of governments to go to war may be similarly flawed.  Far from enhancing 
their own national security, Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor each led to disastrous consequences for the aggressors. The second Iraq war cost the 
United States one trillion dollars, over 4000 military personnel killed in action, and 
considerable reputational capital. It incited further Al Qaida activism, and also left Iran 
unrestrained by what had been a formidable adversary.   
Some of the more significant cyber-threats to national security are also self-inflicted. States 
that commit cybercrime may themselves be weakened as a result, especially when their 
activities come to public attention. States that present themselves as paragons of virtue, only 
to be found to have been engaged in criminal activities, may see their moral authority eroded. 
Hypocrisy tends to be inconsistent with leadership.  The state that does not practice what it 
preaches may lose legitimacy, both domestically and internationally.  This appears to have 
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been the case recently with the United States.  In 2013, the US Government became 
increasingly strident in voicing its displeasure with the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China regarding their programs of economic espionage.  President Obama was to raise the 
issue during his June 2013 summit meeting with President Xi Jianping. However, Obama was 
upstaged by whistleblower Edward Snowden, who disclosed the Prism program and thereby 
revealed that the United States was itself engaged in a massive program of 
telecommunications interception. 
Once it becomes public knowledge, the modus operandi of state cybercrime may well 
enhance the capacity of ordinary cybercriminals and other states. The escaped ‘Stuxnet’ 
virus, reportedly used in the operation against Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, is now 
available for use or further refinement by rogue states and cybercriminals, organised or acting 
alone.  
The potential for ‘conventional’ organised cybercrime to threaten national security is real. Its 
likely impact, however, is by no means constant across all nations. All else equal, states with 
weak economies and those lacking in social cohesion face a greater security risk than robust 
developed nations. Relatively disadvantaged nations may be less able to afford the IT security 
infrastructure to protect state and private information systems (such as they are), particularly 
those supporting financial services. They may also lack the regulatory and enforcement 
resources to prevent and control cybercrime. But the more fortunate nations themselves may 
be attractive targets to cybercriminals. They contain a larger number of targets, both symbolic 
and material. 
In addition, state or state-sponsored cybercrime may inspire imitative criminal behaviour by 
other states and individuals alike. Leadership can function in a wholly unsuitable manner. 
Moreover, states can also provide imitators with a vocabulary of extenuation, a means of 
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rationalising or neutralising criminal acts. The appeal to a higher purpose, the argument that 
the end justifies the means, will be particularly resonant with other states. History has shown 
that many states have pursued objectives which they at the time regarded as honourable, but 
which turned out to be terribly perverse. 
The full consequences of Operation Olympic Games are uncertain, as neither the victims nor 
the perpetrators are inclined to discuss it. With knowledge of the operation now widespread, 
and some of the software elements in the public domain, there are individuals and 
organisations who may follow the example of perpetrators and engage in cyber attacks for 
their own purposes. The ultimate consequences of this potential turn of events are 
unpredictable.  Recent electronic attacks against US financial institutions and Saudi oil 
facilities may represent two examples (Perlroth 2012; Perlroth and Hardy 2013).  
Conclusions 
Not all organisations acting illegally in cyberspace may be regarded as threats to national or 
international security.  Some of their activity is unquestionably annoying, offensive in the 
extreme, and/or harmful. There are online activities which, if writ large, might conceivably 
weaken the integrity and economy of states and thus come to be regarded as security threats.  
Online paedophilia, no matter how heinous or distasteful one might regard it, does not occur 
on a scale at which a nation’s economy or social fabric is damaged. Nor is it likely ever to do 
so.  The software and entertainment industries in the United States have sought to make the 
case that information piracy costs the domestic economy millions of dollars in lost profits, 
and has a chilling effect on entrepreneurialism and creativity world-wide.  However, the US 
economy is sufficiently diverse and vigorous that its future strength will depend on other 
factors. Indeed, one could argue that piracy allows citizens of less developed countries to 
benefit from access to products that they would otherwise be unable to afford. By contrast, 
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major, persistent industrial or political espionage on a wider scale may well threaten the 
security of the target state. Industrial espionage can weaken the international competitiveness 
of a company or of an industry sector. When the information in question relates to weapons 
systems, the security implications are obvious.  Theft of credit card and banking details, were 
it to occur on a larger scale, would certainly impede commercial activity, with corresponding 
harm to a state’s economy. For the time being, however, online fraud appears manageable. 
Technologies of information security continue to be refined, and tech savvy members of the 
public, at least in developing countries, are able to protect themselves. On-line banking and e-
commerce continue to thrive. 
In less developed countries, however, where users are just entering the digital age, lack of 
awareness of cybersecurity may enhance the vulnerability of individuals and of organisations 
in both the public and private sectors. To the extent that the threat of cybercrime impedes the 
development of electronic commerce, it could contribute to the weakening of a nation’s  
economy, and by extension, its security. 
As far as organisations are concerned, it appears that the greatest threats to national security 
are posed by states themselves, either singlehandedly or in collaboration with skilled non-
state actors. Resources available to the strongest states are indeed formidable, and we have 
seen them used with considerable effect.  The activity reported to have led to the destruction 
of Iranian centrifuges would certainly be defined by authorities of that country (or those of 
any other nation on the receiving end of a similar attack) as a security threat. So too would 
denial of service attacks that degrade government information systems or those servers that 
support critical infrastructure. Indeed, nations on the receiving end of such attacks might be 
inclined to regard them as acts of cyber-war (Turns 2012).  
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The activities of Anonymous, for example, eavesdropping on a conference call between law 
enforcement agents and attempts to shut down the website of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, have certainly been found annoying by authorities in the United States. On the scale 
at which they were conducted, activities of this kind were certainly embarrassing, but would 
not constitute harm to national security. However, if undertaken persistently or on a larger 
scale, they might convey the impression of state nonchalance at best, and incompetence at 
worst, and thereby invite imitation from many quarters. The potential for significant harm is 
therefore real, if perhaps somewhat distant. The threshold of objective threat would appear to 
be a function of the scope and intensity of criminal activity on the one hand, and the 
resilience of the state and its infrastructure on the other. 
Other security threats may be self-inflicted by states, as the result of their own cybercriminal 
activity.  The threat intensifies when the illegality in question reaches public attention. This is 
not to suggest that the only crime is ‘getting caught.’ Any illicit activity on the part of the 
state runs the risk of detection and exposure, whether by insiders or external adversaries. 
If organised cybercrime were to occur on a greater scale, it could lead to a weakening of trust 
in major public or private institutions. The fundamental question for our purposes is at what 
point does the nature and scale of online criminal activity (organised or otherwise) begin to 
constitute a security threat. National security is not a binary variable. The question is not ‘are 
you, or are you not, secure?’ but rather ‘might a specific circumstance contribute to an 
enhancement or diminution of security?’ 
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